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JTOISPICHQH
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(j).

DETSRMIIfATIVB ATO8QRIIEI2S
The following authorities may be dispositive of certain issues
of this Appeal:
Rule 8, U.R.C.P. General rules of pleading•
(c)
Affirmative defenses•
In pleading to a
proceeding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively
... fraud ... and any other matter constituted an avoidance
of affirmative defense.
Rule 9, U.R.C.P. Pleading special Batters.
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all
averments of fraud ... the circumstances constituting
fraud ... shall be stated with particularity.
•

e

•

- Vlil -

Rule 11, U.R.C.P.
papers; sanctions.

Signing of pleadings, motions, and other

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modication, or
reversal of existing law... If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court ...
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
... a reasonable attorney's fee."
Rule 12, U.R.C.P.

Defenses and objections.

(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion
as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in
his answer or reply ••.
Rule 69, U.R.C.P.
thereto.

Execution

and proceedings

supplemental

(a)
Issuance of writ of execution.
Process to
enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution unless
the court otherwise directs ...
(b) Contents of writ and to who it may be directed.
. . . it [the writ of execution] shall be directed to the
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in
cases involving real property and shall require the officer
to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ;
provided that if such writ is against the property of the
judgment debtor generally it may direct the constable to
satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the personal
property of the [judgment] debtor and if sufficient
personal property cannot be found then the Sheriff shall
satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of his real
property.
(d)
Service of the writ.
Unless the execution
otherwise directs the officer must execute the writ against
the property of the judgment debtor by levying on a
sufficient amount of property, if their is sufficient
[property]; ..•
(e)

Proceedings on sale of property.

(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real
property the officer shall give to the purchaser
a certificate of sale, containing: ... (4) a
statement to the effect that all right, title,
interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and
to the property is conveyed to the purchaser;

U.C.A. 25-1-13. Bona fide purchasers not affected.
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed
to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate
grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such
grantor.
U.C.A. 25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims.
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to
a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has nurtured, may,
as against any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of
the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or
mediately from such a purchaser:
U.C.A. 57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed.
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the
conveyance that a lesser estate was intended.
U.C.A. 57-4a-4. Presumptions.
(1)
A recorded document creates the following
presumptions regarding title to the rral property affected:
(a)
the Document is genuine and was
executed voluntarily by the person purporting to
execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and
the person on whose behalf it is executed are
the persons they purport to be;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any
lapse of time between dates on the document and
the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f)
the
grantee, transferee, or
beneficiary of an interest created or described
by the document acted in good faith at all
relevant times; ...
U.C.A. 78-12-26. Within three years — Within three years.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggravated party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake•
— v —

U.C.A. 78-22-1.

Lien of judgment.

From the time the judgment of the district court or
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the
cleark of the district court of the county it becomes a
lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, in the county in which the judgment
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him thereafter
acquired during the existence of said lien. ...
U.C.A. 78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or
defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by
statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith*

SI&TEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves quashal of an execution sale and quiet
title to Plaintiff's real property.

A judgment creditor of a prior

joint tenancy owner, claiming a judgment lien, levied execution on
and sold the property of Plaintiff, who was not a judgment or execution debtor.

Under summary judgment, the trial court found that no

lien attached, voided the sale, and awarded damages to Plaintiff.
Willard and Tonya Wood ("Woods") purchased certain real property
("Property") from Ralph and Elaine Kofoed in May 1979, pursuant to an
installment real estate contract.
first mortgage.

The contract was subject to a

For some unknown reason, in December 1979, Kofoeds

delivered a warranty deed to Woods which was then recorded.

In May

1980, Willard Wood conveyed his joint tenacy interest by a recorded
warranty deed ("Willard Wood Deed") to his wife, Tonya Wood.

In June

1981, a money judgment ("Judgment") was entered against Willard Wood
in favor of appellants Max Burton [Sr*] and Emily Burton ("Burtons").
When it was docketed, Willard Wood had no interest in the Property,
having previously conveyed his interest to Tonya Wood.
In September 1981, Gregory Baldwin and appellee Lynda Baldwin,
("Baldwins") purchased a home from Tonya Wood for $215#000, pursuant
to

a

recorded

warranty

deed.

Immediately

prior

to

Baldwins'

purchase, Tonya Wood executed and recorded a trust deed ("Kofoed
Trust Deed") in favor of Kofoeds, and Baldwins took fee simple title
subject to it and the first mortgage.

Willard Wood also signed the

Kofoed Trust Deed, which gave the appearance on the public record
that he had some naked interest in the Property, notwithstanding he
had conveyed his estate to Tonya Wood in May 1980.

Therefore, upon

Baldwins' purchase from Tonya Wood, Willard Wood also signed the deed
- r -

to Baldwins to eliminate such naked interest• At the time, Baldwins
had no notice of the Willard Wood Deed or the Judgment.
In December 1982, Gregory Baldwin conveyed his interest in the
Property by recorded quite claim deed to Lynda Baldwin.

In April

1983, Willard Wood filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition ("Wood's
Bankruptcy,f) and listed and notified Burtons as his creditors. The
Wood's Bankruptcy voided the Judgment to the extent of any personal
obligation of Willard Wood thereunder.
In June 1987, the assignee beneficiary under the Kofoed Trust
Deed foreclosed the interest of Lynda Baldwin pursuant to a trustee's
sale.

In October 1987, Lynda Baldwin reacquired the property from

the purchaser at the trustee's sale.

Prior to the trustee's sale,

Burtons received notice of it and caused a writ of execution to issue
under the Judgment• The writ was initiated by Burtons notwithstanding the Judgment had been voided and a bankruptcy stay order was in
affect. The writ represented that the Judgment was enforceable and
commanded the sheriff to levy on and sell the "unexeiipt real property
of the said Willard D. Wood," the judgment debtor.

The writ was

issued, notwithstanding there was no valid lien on the Property.
Simultaneously, Burtons issued a praecipe to the sheriff
directing him to levy on "the rightf title and interest of Gregory
Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-in-interest of Willard D.
Wood" in the Property.

Pursuant to Burtons' instructions, the

sheriff levied execution not on Willard Wood's alleged interest, the
judgment debtor, but directly on Baldwins' interest.

The sheriff

advertised Baldwins' interest for sale, sold it at a sheriff's sale,
and filed a notice of sale of such interest*

The sheriff then

recorded a certificate of sale of Baldwins' interest, and delivered

a sheriff's deed for such interest to Emily Burton and her son, Max
Burton Jr.

("Burton, Jr.").

Burtons caused the levy against Lynda

Baldwin's property notwithstanding she was not a party to Burtons'
prior lawsuit against Willard Wood, not a judgment debtor under the
Judgment, and not an execution debtor under the writ of execution.
Burtons and Burton Jr. ("Burton Group") assert that the Willard
Wood Deed was a fraudulent conveyance, notwithstanding they have
never made a claim to void it; that Willard Wood had an estate in the
Property, notwithstanding the conveyance, and a judgment lien
attached to that interest; tha tBurtons could "disregarding the
conveyance" and levy execution directly on the interest of Baldwins
as alleged "successors-in-interest of Willard Wood"; and that the
Burton Group was not required to take any equitable action or assert
any claim to void the conveyance. The Burton Group also asserts that
if Lynda Baldwin was a bona-fide purchaser for value from Tonya Wood,
she lost that status because of the subsequent trustee's sale of her
interest.

Thus, the Burton Group asserts that Emily Burton and

Burton Jr. now own all the interest of Lynda Baldwin in the Property.
Paul Richins, substitute appellee for Lynda Baldwin, asserts
that the Willard Wood Deed was a prima facie valid conveyance that
could only be voided, if at all, by an equitable action by Burtons if
they thought it was fraudulent; that the Burton Group has not
commenced an equitable action or made a claim for fraud to void the
deed; that even if the deed was fraudulent, Baldwins purchased the
property from Tonya Wood, not Willard Wood, without notice of any
alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed, and thus Baldwins were
bona-fide purchasers for value; that Lynda Baldwin did not loose that
status because of the subsequent trustee's sale; and that following
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the subsequent trustee's sale, Lynda Baldwin reacquired the Property
and has fee simple title*
After

reacquiring

the

property,

Lynda

Baldwin

amended

her

complaint and moved for summary judgment to void the Judgment, quash
the execution sale, void the sheriff's deed, quiet her title, recover
her damages for Burtons' wrongful execution, and dismiss the Burton
Groups' counterclaim.

The Burton Group also moved for summary

judgment on their counterclaim.
In its Memorandum

Decision, and subsequent

1989 Order and

Partial Summary Judgment, both dated June 21, 1989, the trial court
held that the Willard Wood Deed was valid; that Willard Wood had no
interest in the Property when the Judgment was entered; that the
Judgment was voided by Wood's Bankruptcy; that Burtons' execution
upon Lynda Baldwin's property was wrongful and void; and that Lynda
Baldwin's damages resulting from the wrongful execution would be
reserved for later determination.

Lynda Baldwin's title was quieted

and the Burton Groups' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. In
its later 1990 Order and 1990 Judgment, both dated June 4, 1990, the
trial

court

awarded

damages

to

Lynda

Baldwin

of

$7,872.66,

representing her "attorney's fees and related damagesH in the matter.
After the Burton Group filed the appeal, Paul Richins became the
assignee of appellee Lynda Baldwin's judgment and interest, and was
later substituted as appellee in her place with the consent of
appellants.

Paul Richins asserts the trial court was justified in

all respects because of the Burton Group's clearly wrongful execution
on a void judgment, without a valid statutory lien or due process,
and against the property of a person who was neither a judgment
debtor or execution debtor nor party to that proceeding.
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The following parties are hereinafter referred to as follows:
Appellee Lynda C. Baldwin as "Lynda Baldwin"; Gregory B. Baldwin as
"Greg Baldwin"; Lynda Baldwin and Greg Baldwin collectively as
"Baldwins"; Willard D. Wood as "Willard Wood"; Tonya G. Wood as
"Tonya Wood"; Willard Wood and Tonya Wood collectively as "Woods";
Appellant Max D. Burton, Sr. as "Burton, Sr."; Appellant Emily A.
Burton as "Emily Burton"; Appellants Burton, Sr, and Emily Burton
collectively as "Burtons"; Appellant Max D. Burton, Jr. as "Burton,
Jr."; the Burtons and Burton, Jr. collectively as "Burton Group";
M.D. "Pete" Hayward as "Sheriff"; and Substitute Appellee Paul H.
Richins as "Richins".
The following material facts are alleged in Lynda Baldwin's
"Amended Complaint" ("Complaint"), (R. 288), and in her "Memorandum
In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Memorandum"), (R. 425),
and

"Supplemental

Motion

For Summary

Judgment" ("Supplemental

Motion"), (Re 472). Except for facts #10 in the Memorandum, these
facts are substantially uncontroverted in the Burton Group's "Answer
To Amended Complaint" ("Answer"), (Re 387), and in their responses to
those Motions, (R. 488; R. 498), Ss& Rule 4-501(5), C.J.A.:
1. On May 15, 1979, Kofoed, as sellers, and Woods, as buyers,
executed a "Uniform Real Estate Contract" ("Kofoed Contract") for the
Property.

(R. 325)

On December 19, 1979, Kofoeds, as grantors,

executed a "Warranty Deed" ("Kofoed Deed") for the Property to Woods,
as grantees, which was recorded on December 19, 1979.
289, #10; R. 389, #1)

(R. 328; R.

Under the Kofoed Deed, Woods acquired the

Property as joint tenants.

(R. 290, #11; R. 389, #1)

2.

On May 1, 1980, Willard Wood, as grantor, executed a

"Warranty Deed" ("Willard Wood Deed") for his joint tenancy interest
in the Property to Tonya Wood, as grantee, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "A", which was recorded on May 28, 1980. (R.329;
R. 290, #12; R. 389, #1; R. 70, #3)
3.

On February 20, 1981, Burtons, as plaintiffs, filed a

"Verified Complaint" in another action against Clealon Mann and
Willard Wood, as defendants ("Burton Lawsuit").

(R. 330; R. 290,

#13; R. 389, #1)
4.

On June 9, 1981, an in personam

" ?* miUfl fY Judgment"

("Judgment") was entered in the Burton Lawsuit in favor of Burtons
against Clealon Mann and Willard Wood, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "B".

(R. 333; R. 290, #13; R. 389, #1) The Judgment did not

create a statutory lien on the Property under Section 78-22-1,
U.C.A., because Willard Wood had no interest in it when the Judgment
was docketed.
5. On September 30, 1981, Woods, as trustors, executed a "Trust
Deec^" ("Kofoed Trust Deed") covering the Property in favor of
Kofoeds, as beneficiaries, which was recorded on October 2, 1981.
(R. 334; R. 290, #15; R. 389, #1)
6e On September 30, 1981, Baldwins purchased the Property from
Tonya Wood for $215,000.00, all of which has been paid.

(R. 89, #2;

R. 85, #2; R. 290, #16; R. 389, #1; R. 409, #3) Tonya Wood was the
only titled owner of record.

(R. 158; R. 546; #6; R. 550) On the

same day, Tonya Wood, as grantor, executed a "Warranty Deed" ("Woods'
Deed") for the Property to Baldwins, as grantees, which was recorded
on

October

2, 1981.

(R. 337; R.

291, #19; R.

389, #1)

Notwithstanding Willard Wood also signed this deed, he had no
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interest to convey because he had previously conveyed it to Tonya
Wood under the Willard Wood Deed. (Ex. n A w )
7.

Upon acquiring the Property, Baldwins did not have any

notice from any source of the Judgment itself, (R. R. 81; #3; R. 86,
#3; R. 410, #4; R. 413, #4; R. 546, #8; R. 566, #3); no notice
whatsoever of any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed, (R. 546,
#8); and no notice of anything that would cause them to know or
believe that there was anything improper regarding the Willard Wood
Deed or that would cause them to inquire further

into that

conveyance, (R. 410, #5; R. 413, #5; R. 566, #3). Baldwins believed
Tonya Wood was the only titled owner of record, and Willard Wood
executed the Woods7 Deed only because he appeared as a trustor with
Tonya Wood on the Kofoed Trust Deed and, consequently, might appear
to have some naked interest of record notwithstanding his prior
conveyance.

(R. 410, #6; R. 413, #6)

8. On February 24, 1982, a "Partial Satisfaction of Judgement"
was entered in the Burton Lawsuit, (R. 339; R. 291, #20; R. 389, #1).
Under the Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, Willard Wood remained
liable for $4,323.73 on the Judgment, plus interest.

(R. 291, #21;

R. 389, #1)
9.

On December 21, 1982, Greg Baldwin, as grantor, executed a

"Quit-Claim Deed" for his interest in the Property to Lynda Baldwin,
as grantee, which was recorded on December 21, 1982.

(R. 340; R.

291, #22; R. 389, #1)
10. On April 21, 1983, Willard Wood, together with Tonya Wood,
filed a "Petition For Voluntary Bankruptcy" ("Wood's Bankruptcy")
under Chapter 7 in the United States Bankruptcy Code, a copy of which
is attached as Exhibit "C". (R. 341; R. 470, #3? R567, #4; R, 291,

#23; R. 389, #1) Under the Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons are listed as
creditors of Willard Wood and were given notice of Wood's Bankruptcy.
(R. 291, #24; R. 389, #1; R. 447, #3; R. 567, #4)

Pursuant to 11

U.S.C., Section 524(a)(1), upon Willard Wood's discharge in bankruptcy in December 1983, (R. 470, #4; R. 567, #6), the Judgment was
"void" and he was released from all personal liability thereunder*
Burtons were thereafter stayed from collecting the Judgment.
11.

On August 6, 1986, nevertheless, Burtons caused an

"Execution" ("Execution") to issue on the Judgment against Willard
Wood, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D". (R. 343; R. 291,
#25; R. 389, #4.a.).

Under the Execution, the Sheriff had apparent

authority to levy on and sell only the unexempt property of Willard
Wood, (R. 292, #29; R. 389, #1), but no authority to levy on and sell
the real property of Baldwins.
12.

On August

4,

(R. 292, #30; R. 389, #4.b.)

1986, Burtons

prepared

a "Praecipe"

("Praecipe"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "E", which they
later delivered to the Sheriff.

(R. 344, R. 292, #31; R. 389, #1)

Under the Praecipe, however, Burtons directed the Sheriff to levy
upon the right, title and interest of Baldwins in the Property, (R.
292, #33; R. 390, #4.c), rather than 1 evy upon the nonexempt
property of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood, as the Execution
purportedly authorized, (R. 343; R. 292, #32). Baldwins are neither
judgment debtors under the Judgment, (R. 333), or execution debtors
under the Execution, (R. 343), nor parties to the Burton Lawsuit, (R.
330), referred to by the Judgment, Execution and Praecipe.
13.

On August 11, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Notice of Real

Estate Levy" ("Notice of Levy"), a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "F". (R. 346; R. 292, #34; R. 389, #1) Under the Notice of

Levy, the Sheriff levied upon all the right, title and interest of
Baldwins (rather than Willard Wood) in the Property.

(R. 346)

14. On August 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Notice of Real
Estate Sale," ("Notice of Sale"), a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "G", which was filed on August 17, 1986.
#35; R. 389, #1)

(R. 347; R. 293,

Under the Notice of Sale, the Sheriff stated he

intended to sell the right, title and interest of Baldwins (rather
than Willard Wood) in the Property.

(R. 347; R. 293, #37)
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On August 15, 1986, the Sheriff caused to be published a "Notice of
Real Estate Sale" ("Newspaper Notice"), a copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "H".

(R. 348; R. 293, #39; R. 389, #1)

Under the

Newspaper Notice, the Sheriff that he intended to sell all the right,
title and interest of Baldwins (rather than Willard Wood) in the
Property.
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(R. 348; R. 293, #41)
On September 9, 1986, the Sheriff conducted a sheriff's

sale ("Execution Sale"), wherein the Sheriff sold all the right,
title and interest of Baldwins in the Property, (R. 294, #44; R. 390,
4.d., 4. a., 4.b.), but did not sell the interest of Willard Wood.
(R. 352; R. 353; R. 366; R. 294, #47; R. 390, #4.d.)

At the

Execution Sale, the Sheriff sold the interest of Baldwins to Burtons
for $8,760.10.
17.

(R. 352; R. 353; R. 366; R* 290, #45)

On or about September 8, 1986, Burton, Sr. signed the

worksheet regarding the Execution Sale.

(R. 294, #49; R. 389, #1)

On September 9, 1986, Burton, Jr. purchased Burton, Sr.'s interest in
the Judgment.

(R. 265; R. 296, #61)

18. On September 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Real EstateExecution Return" ("Execution Return"), a copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "I", which was filed on September 12, 1986.

(R. 352; R.

294, #50) Under the Execution Return, the Sheriff stated he sold the
right, title and interest of Baldwins (not Willard Wood) in the
Property, (R. 352; R. 294, #51), not the interest of Willard Wood.
(R. 352; R. 294, #51)
19. On September 12, 1986, the Sheriff prepared a "Real Estate
Certificate of Sale-Execution" ("Certificate of Sale"), a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "J", which was recorded on September 16,
1986.

(R. 353; R. 294, #53)

Under the Certificate of Sale, the

Sheriff stated that he "... was commanded ... to satisfy the judgment
in said action [Burton Lawsuit] by selling the unexempt real property
of the said defendant [Willard Wood]."

(Emphasis added.)

(R. 353;

R. 295, #54; R. 389, #1)
20.

On May 7, 1987, the Sheriff executed a "Sheriff's Deed"

("Sheriff's Deed"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "K", which
was recorded on May 8, 1987.

(R. 366; R. 296, #63; R. 389, #1)

Under the Sheriff's Deed, the Sheriff conveyed to Burton, Jr. and
Emily Burton all the right, title and interest of Baldwins (not
Willard Wood) in the Property.
21.

(R. 296, #s 63-64)

On June 10, 1987, the trustee under the Kofoed Trust Deed

sold the Property at a trustee's sale ("Trustee's Sale"), and
delivered a "Trustee's Deed" to Robert Rice, which was recorded on
June 18, 1987.

(R. 368; 296, #65; R. 389, #1)

On June 18, 1987,

Robert Rice, as grantor, delivered a "Warranty Deed" for the Property
to Derald Tilley, as grantee, which was recorded on June 18, 1987.
(R. 371, R. 296, #67; R. 389, #1)
22.

On October 17, 1987, Derald Tilley executed a "Quit Claim

Deed" for the Property to Lynda Baldwin, which was recorded on
October 8, 1987.

(R. 379, R. 297, #71; 389, #1)

23.

On June 22, 1988, Lynda Baldwin, as grantor, executed a

"Quit Claim Deed" for the Property to the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust,
which was recorded on June 23, 1988. (R. 380; 297, #72; R. 389, #1)
24.

The Burton Group has never sought or obtained a decree in

any court voiding the conveyance of (i) Willard Wood to Tonya Wood
under the Willard Wood Deed, or (ii) Tonya Wood to Baldwins under the
Woods' Deed.
25.

(R. 433, #39; R. 298, #83; R. 299, #85)

The Burton Group has never obtained a decree in any court

reviving the Judgment from Wood's Bankruptcy or authorizing the
Sheriff to levy on and sell the interest of Baldwins in the Property.
(R. 297, #74; R. 390, #4.e., 4.a. and 4.b.).

They have never

obtained a decree in any court foreclosing their judgment lien
against the Property or the interest of Linda Baldwin therein. They
have never had possession of the Property. (R. 409, #3; R. 412, #3)
26. Lynda Baldwin has never been personally served with a copy
of the Execution, Praecipe, Notice of Levy or Notice of Sale
regarding the levy on and sale of her property, and has never been
served with process of any kind in the Burton Lawsuit. (R. 410, #7;
R. 413, #7). She has never received notice of any hearing in the
Burton Lawsuit, and has never waived her right to due process of law.
(R. 410, #8; R. 413, #8)
27. After reacquiring the Property, Lynda Baldwin amended her
complaint and filed a "Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Motion"), (R.
423), a "Supplemental Motion For Declaratory Or Summary Judgment"
("Supplemental Motion"),

(R. 472), and

a

"Motion

To Dismiss

Counterclaim" of the Burton Group, (R. 477). The Burton Group also
moved for summary judgment on their counterclaim. (R. 493)

28. In its "Memorandum Decision" ("Memorandum Decision)", dated
May 25, 1989, (R. 572), and subsequent "Order" ("1989 Order"), (R.
590), and "Partial Summary Judgment" ("Partial Summary Judgement"),
(R. 587), both dated June 21, 1989, copies of which are attached as
Exhibits "L", "M", and "N", respectively, the trial court held that:
(i) the Willard Wood Deed was valid; (ii) Willard Wood had no
interest in the Property when the Judgment was entered; (iii) Burtons
didn't have a lien against the Property; (iv) the Burton Group could
have filed an action to attack the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent
conveyance, but didn't; (v) the statute of limitations had run on
asserting a claim for fraudulent conveyance; (vi) the Judgment was
voided by Wood's Bankruptcy; (vii) Baldwins were bona fide purchasers
for value; (viii) the Execution Sale was wrongful and violated Lynda
Baldwin's due process rights; (ix) the Execution Sale and Sheriff's
Deed were void; and (x) Lynda Baldwin's damages would be reserved for
later determination.

Title was quieted in Lynda Baldwin, and the

Burton Groups' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.
29.

In its

"QE£S£ M

("1990 Order"), (R. 669), and "Judgment"

("1990 Judgment)", (R. 667), both dated June 4, 1990, copies of which
are attached as Exhibits "O" and "P", respectively, the trial court
awarded Lynda Baldwin damages against the Burton Group of $7,872.66,
representing her "attorney's fees and related damages" in the matter.
The 1990 Judgment was granted based on the "Affidavit Of Attorney's
Fees" filed by Lynda Baldwin's counsel.

(R. 641) Burtons objected

to the Affidavit, (R. 659), but did not file any opposing affidavit.
30.

After the Burton Group appealed, Paul Richins became the

assignee of appellee Lynda Baldwin's judgment and interest, and was
later substituted as appellee with the Burton Group's consent.

SPWMARY OF APCTHENTS
ARGUMENT I
The Judgment Is Lien Only Against Unexempt Real Property
Of The Judgment Debtor, Willard Wood, Owned At The Time
The Judgment is a lien against only the unexempt real property
of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood, owned by him at the time the
Judgment is docketed, and not a lien against the property of any
other person, particularly Lynda Baldwin who is not even a party to
the Burton Lawsuit.
ARGUMENT II
The Judgment Is Void Pursuant To Willard Wood's Bankruptcy;
And Judgment Lien Did Not Survive The Bankruptcy
The Judgment is an void under 11 U•S.C•, Section 524(a)(1),
because of the bankruptcy of Willard Wood, and no lien survived
Wood's Bankruptcy for the reason that there was never was a valid
lien to begin with.

Pursuant to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons were no

longer creditors of Willard Wood*
ARGUMENT III
Burtons Had No Remedy To Levy Execution Against The Property
Without A Valid Statutory Lien And An Enforceable Judgment
A writ of execution may not lawfully issue under Rule 69(a)
U.R.C.P., in absence of a valid lien supported by an enforceable and
valid judgment.

In this case, there was neither.
ARGUMENT IV

Burtons Had No Remedy To Bring An Equitable Action To Attempt To
Set Aside The Willard Wood Deed Without An Enforceable Judgment
Wood's Bankruptcy prohibited the Burton Group from bringing a
new claim to attack the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance,
since they were no longer creditors of Willard Wood.

The Fraudulent

Conveyance Act does not create a "new claim11 following a bankruptcy.
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ARGUMENT V
The Burton Group Has Waived Any Claim Of Fraudulent Conveyance
By Not Raising It As An Affirmative Defense In Their Answer
The Burton Group did not raise fraud as an affirmative defense
in their Answer, as required by Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., nor pled it with
particularity, as required by Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P.

They have waived

that defense and are precluded from later making or asserting a claim
for fraudulent conveyance in response to a motion for summary
judgment.

If the Burton Group believed the Willard Wood Deed was a

fraudulent conveyance, they were compelled to plead and proved it*
ARGUMENT VI
Statute of Limitations Bars The Burton Group From
Attacking Willard Wood Deed As Fraudulent Conveyance
Burtons were chargeable with "constructive notice" of the
allegedly fraudulent conveyance under the Willard Wood Deed at least
when they became judgment creditors of Willard Wood, and the threeyear statute of limitation began to run on June 9, 1981, the date the
Judgment was docketed. Other facts may establish constructive notice
prior to or slightly later than that date. The Burton Group is timebarred in asserting a claim for a fraudulent conveyance.
ARGUMENT VII
The Willard Wood Deed Is Valid, And Has Never Been
Set Aside Or Properly Challenged In Any Equitable Action
The recorded Willard Wood Deed is prima facie genuine and valid.
A conveyance which is fraudulent as to creditors is not absolutely
void, but only voidable upon some affirmative action by an interested
person. The Burton Group could have challenged the deed as a fraudulent conveyance prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, but didn't. They deemed
it "unnecessary".

Burtons wrongfully invoked the remedy of Section

25-1-15(2), U.C.A.
- id

-

ARGUMENT VIII
Lynda Baldwin Was Deprived Of Her Property
Without Due Process Under the Execution Proceedings
Under the execution proceedings, Lynda Baldwin was deprived of
a substantial property right without due process of law. She was not
a party to the Burton Lawsuit, nor a judgment or execution debtor,
nor a fraudulent transferee under any conveyance. There was no order
authorizing a sale of her property.
ARGUMENT IX
Lynda Baldwin Is A Bona Fide Purchaser For Value
And Has Never Lost That Status
When Lynda Baldwin and Greg Baldwin purchased the Property from
Tonya Wood, they were bona fide purchasers for value. Lynda Baldwin
is not required to prove in the first instance that she was a bona
fide purchaser. The burden was on Burtons to plead and prove she was
not.

She never lost that status, notwithstanding a trustee's sale.
ARGUMENT X

The Burton Group Wrongfully Levied Execution On Lynda Baldwins'
Property Which Justified Setting Aside Execution Sale
The Burton Group acquired a writ of execution without an
enforceable judgment and without a valid statutory lien. They levied
execution on Lynda Baldwin's property, who was not a judgment or
execution creditor, or fraudulent transferee under any conveyance.
ARGUMENT XI
The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Lynda Baldwin
Attorney Fees And Related Damages
The trial court correctly awarded Lynda Baldwin damages of
"attorney's fees and related damages11 under (i) Section 78-27-56,
U.C.A., (ii) wrongful execution, (iii) slander of title, (iv) Rule
11, U.R.C.P., or (v) a combination of them.
- is -

ARGUMENT XII
Summary Judgment Is Appropriate
The Burton Group may not avoid Lynda Baldwin's motions for
summary judgment, which are supported by affidavits, by resting on
mere assertions, allegations and factual conclusions. They have not
set forth specific facts under the issues of the pleadings showing a
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.
ARGUMENT I
The Judgment Is Lien Only Against Unexempt Real Property
Of The Judgment Debtor, Willard Wood, Owned At The Time
The Burton Group's main response to Lynda Baldwin's Motions for
Summary Judgment and throughout their Brief is the claim that when
the Judgment was docketed, a judgment lien attached to the Property
pursuant to Section 78-22-1, U.C.A.; that the lien survived Wood's
Bankruptcy; that the lien had priority over the subsequent purchase
by Baldwins; and that Burtons were entitled to satisfy the Judgment
by levying execution on and selling the interest of Baldwins, as
alleged wsuccessors-in-interest of Willard Wood". However, Willard
Wood conveyed his joint tenancy interest in the Property to Tonay
Wood under the recorded Willard Wood Deed (Ex. *hn)

over one year

before the Judgment (Ex. "B11) was docketed. Therefore, Willard Wood
had no interest in the Property, and no lien attached. Regardless of
anything Willard Wood later signed, that conveyance has never been
set aside and conclusively conveyed his estate at that time!
f,

The creation, legal effect, and extent of a judgment are set

out in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22-1.w
P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988).

Cox Corp. v. Vertin. 754

The rule of strict construction must be

employed in determining whether one is authorized to have a statutory
lien.

Dean v. McFarland. 500 Pe2d 1244 (Wash. 1972).
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The scope

cannot be extended. American Buildings Company v. Wheeler's Stores,
585 P.2d 845 (Wyo. 1978).

Section 78-22-1 provides for "whose"

property the lien attaches, and "when" the lien attaches:
"From the time the judgment of the district court or
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the
clerk of the district of the county it becomes a lien upon
all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt
from execution, in the county in which the judgment is
entered, owned by his at the time, or by him thereafter
acquired during the existence of said lien."
Under the facts of this case, only the unexempt real property of
the "judgment debtor", Willard Wood, "owned by him at the time" is
exposed to a lien imposed by a judgment in personam.

Belnap v.

Slain, 575 p.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978); Taylor Natt Inct Vt Jensen
Bros. Const. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah 1982).

A judgment lien

commences from the date the judgment is entered. Hartley v. Liberty
Park Associates. 774 P.2d 40, 42 (Wash. App. 1989); 49 C.J.S.,
Judgments, Sec. 466(a), p. 902.
But Willard Wood had effectively divested himself of his
interest before Burtons recorded the Judgment, and the Property was
no longer "real property of the judgment debtor" under the statute.
Rowe v. Schultz. 642 P.2d 881, 882 (Ariz* App. 1982).

"Under no

circumstances will a judgment or decree take effect upon rights not
then existing." 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) Sec. 712, p. 1503.
"The court views this section as requiring that the judgment debtor
shall be the owner, or have a vested interest, in the real estate."
Warren v. Rodgers. 475 P.2d 775, 776 (N.M. 1970)-

If the Property

was not owned by him at the time, then no lien attached. Belnap, at
698, citing Maiewsky v. Empire Construction Company, 467 P.2d 547
(Cal 1970). Sfifi also Romeo v. State. 642 P.2d 172, 176 (N.M. 1982);
citing 2 A.C. Freeman On Judgments, Sec. 950 (5th ed. 1925).

In this case, the judgment lien was clearly subordinate to the
Willard Wood Deed, and did not attach to any interest of Willard Wood
conveyed to Tony Wood thereunder.

Where a judgment debtor no longer

owns property, filing of a judgment cannot relate back and make the
judgment a lien on property theretofore owned by the judgment debtor.
49 C.J.S. Judgments, Sec. 466(b), p. 903.

f,

A judgment creditor

cannot place a lien against the property of a judgment debtor's
grantee."

Lach v. Desert Bank. 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah App. 1987).

A judgment lien is not effective as to property conveyed from a
judgment debtor prior to recording of the judgment. Lack, at 804-05.
Ses also Teed v. Ridco Reality. Inc.. 655 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Ariz.
App. 1982); RoweP supra, at 883; citing 10 A. G. Thompson on Real
Property, Sec* 5308, at 662 (1957); McClanahan v. Hawkins. 367 P.2d

196 (wash. 1961).

Hannah y f Martinson, 758 p.2d 276, 278-79 (Mont.

1978); and 49 C.J.S. Judgments, Sec. 485, at p. 929 (1947).
Nothing in 78-22-1, U.C.A., imposes a lien on the real property
of any person other than the judgment debtor, including an alleged
"successor-in-interest11.

The statute is intended to limit the lien

to property of the judgment debtor only, and not give a lien on some
other person's property". Sfifi Thompson v. Hendricks. 245 P. 724, 726
(Or. 1926); United Finance Co, Gladstone v. King. 590 P.2d 228, 229
(Or. 1979); Partlow v. Clark. 653 P.2d 568, 569 (Or* App. 1983); and
Wilson v. Willamette Industries. 569 P.2d 609, 611 (Or. 1977). Lynda
Baldwin is not "judgment debtors", nor a "successors-in-interest" of
Willard Wood.

Baldwins are transferees of Tonya Wood.

Nor does the

statute does not authorizes a lien on Tonya Wood's independent, joint
tenancy interest.

"Even though a judgment creditor held a lien on

one joint tenant's undivided one-half interest in the real property,

no lien existed
property."

on the second

joint tenant's

interest

in the

First Nat. Bank of South Glenn v. Energy Fuels Inc.

Corp., 618 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1980).
Willard Wood delivered the Willard Wood Deed to Tonya Wood, but
later executed the Kofoed Trust Deed, thus creating the appearance on
the public record that he still had some "naked interest" in to the
Property. Whenever one has no beneficial interest "there is nothing
to which the judgment lien can attach".

Belnap, at 699. A judgment

lien attaches only to actual and not to apparent interest of judgment
debtor; for the protection of equities, a judgment lien is confined
to actual interest which judgment debtor had at the time the lien
attached.

Thompson. at 725-26.

Nor did a judgment lien attach to the independent, one-half
interest Tony Wood acquired from directly from Kofoeds and later
conveyed to Baldwins. If a non-judgment debtor is the owner of onehalf, joint tenancy interest in property, and conveyance thereof
vests in the transferee a title unassailable as fraudulent as to
creditors
interest.

of the

judgment debtor who

hold

the

other

one-half

See McHenry F.S> . Inc. v. Clausen, 491 P.2d 592, 594

(Colo. 1971); and Schwaller T.umhgr Co., Inc. v. Watson. 505 p.2d 640,
645 (Kan. 1973).
It is clear from Section 78-22-1, U.C.A., that a judgment lien
is confined to the "actual interest" in the Property which the
"judgment debtor", Willard Wood, "owned at the time" the Judgment was
docketed.

Since Willard Wood had no interest in the Property at the

time the Judgment was docketed, no valid judgment lien attached.

ARGUMENT II
The Judgment Is Void Pursuant To Willard Wood's Bankruptcy;
And Judgment Lien Did Not Survive The Bankruptcy
In April 1983, Willard Wood filed a Chapter 7 petition for
voluntary bankruptcy together with with Tonya Wood, (Ex. "C"), was
discharged in August 1983, and the case was closed in December 1983,
(R. 470, #4). Burtons were listed as judgment creditors and given
notice of Wood's Bankruptcy, (R. 291, #24; R. 389, #1), and never
denied

it.

In August

1983, Willard Wood was discharged

in

bankruptcy, and his case was close in December 1983, (R. 470, #4).
Therefore, under 11 U.S.C., Section 524(a)(1), the Judgment is "void"1
to the extent of the personal liability of Willard Wood:
"Effect of discharge.
this title —>

(a)

A discharge in a case under

(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to
the extent that such judgment is a determination
of the personal liability of the debtor
"
The Judgment [was] an unsecured claim, fully dischargeable under
that bankruptcy statute. Section 524(a)(1) merely voids judgments to
the extent they are unsecured, and a judgment creditor cannot seek
recovery in his judgment other than that obtainable against his
security.

In Re Sillani. 9 B.R. 188, 189 (S.D. Florida 1981).

The

Burton Group claims a valid judgment lien attached to the Property
prior to Wood's Bankruptcy.
filed a proof of claim.

But as "lien claimants", they never

(R. 567, #5)

solely on their "alleged11 lien.

Therefore, they must rely

De Laney v. City and County of

Denver. 185 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1950).
In their

Brief, page

44, the

Burton

Group

state that,

notwithstanding the discharge of Willard Wood's personal liability
under the Judgment, "Burtons' judgment lien was upon the property,
- on -

which passed to Baldwins upon Hood's execution of the September 30,
1981 Warranty Deed."

They further argue that 11 U.S.C., Section

506(d) M•• expressly excludes from discharge liens which have not
been made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding, either by the filing
of a proof of claim or by being made an "allowed secured claim".
They cite the legislative history, Matter of Taraow.749 F.2d 464 (7th
Cir. 1984), and De Laney, supra, as supporting authority*
However Matter of Tarnow and DeLaney are distinguishable because
both concern statutory liens that attached to the property prior to
the debtor's bankruptcy*

In this case, a valid lien never attached

to the Property prior to Wood's Bankruptcy! If there was no lien, it
certainly couldn't be "passed to Baldwins" under any scenerio.
ARGUMENT III
Burtons Had No Remedy To Levy Execution Against The Property
Without A Valid Statutory Lien And An Enforceable Judgment
Rule 69(a), U.R.C.P., provides that the "[p]rocess to enforce a
judgment shall be by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise
directs . • •w

The statute seems to confine the legal process to

enforcement of a "judgment". It says nothing about enforcement of a
"judgment lien".

Arguably, a writ of execution is not the legal

process for enforcement of a "lien", in and of itself, in absence of
a valid and an enforceable judgment to support it*

w

.. Ordinarily,

a judgment lien is enforced by a levy or sale under the judgment
creating it.w But, ".. the lien generally terminates when the judgment ceases to be enforceable .." Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 700
(Utah 1978); quoting 2 Freeman On Judgments (5th Ed*)* Sec. 1017a, p.
2123.

In any event, for issuance of a writ of execution on real

property, a valid lien must attach whether or not an enforceable
judgment is required.

But neither is present in this case.
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Nonetheless, just as Section 78-22-1, U.C.A., specifically
confines the lien to the unexempt real property of the judgment
debtor, Rule 69(b), U.R.C.P., also limits the writ of execution to
the property of the judgment debtor, and does not authorize execution
on some other person's property. The Rule states that " [u]less the
execution otherwise directs, the officer must execute the writ
against the property of the judgment debtor ...t9

Even if there was

a valid lien on the Property supported by an enforceable judgment
under which a writ of execution may duly issue, the Execution (Ex.
lf n

D ) authorizes a levy on and sale of only the unexempt real property

of Willard Wood, the judgment debtor, not that of Baldwins:
"THESE ARE THEREFORE, to command you to .. levy on and sell
.. the unexempt real property of the said Willard D. Wood.11
Following a ordinary execution sale, Rule 69(e)(6), U.R.C.P.,
authorizes the sheriff to convey " •• all right, title, interest and
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property", but not that of
a non-judgment debtor, and Rule 69(d), U.R.C.P. provides that "[ajny
excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs must be
returned to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the
judgment or order of the court.11

Thus, Rule 69, U.R.C.P., clearly

limits the process of enforcing a judgment by writ of execution to
the property of the "judgment debtor99, unless otherwise directed.
The Judgment contains no decree authorizing or directing a levy on
the property of Lynda Baldwin, a non-judgment debtor, nor an order of
sale having such effect. Therefore, even if Willard Wood hadn't been
discharged in bankruptcy, the Judgment is not one upon which a writ
of execution may duly issue for the purpose of levying on and selling
the property of Lynda Baldwin.

ARGUMENT IV
Burtons Had No Remedy To Bring An Equitable Action To Attempt To
Set Aside The Willard Wood Deed Without An Enforceable Judgment
"A levy of execution is ordinarily the only proper method to
enforce

a

judgment

circumstances ..ff

lien,

unless

the

case

involves

special

Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978);

citing Free v. Faraworth. 188 P.2d 731 (Utah 1948).

Even if the

Willard Wood Deed was a fraudulent conveyance, this case involves
special circumstances such that execution under Rule 69(a) did not
lie.

Belnap. at 700-01.

M

.. [W]here for some reason execution does

not lie, the procedure for enforcement is an equitable action to
foreclose the judgment lien", Belnap at 701, and "have the court
control the sale of the property after determining the priority of
liens".

Belnap. at 700, citing the general rule set forth in 2

Freeman On Judgments, 5th Ed., Section 1017a, p. 2123, which is:
"... Ordinarily a judgment lien is enforced by a levy or
sale under the judgment creating it. And since the lien
generally terminates when the judgment ceases to be
enforceable, there would be no occasion for resorting to
equity in most cases. Nevertheless, if for amy reason
there is no remedy at law, or the remedy provided by
statute is inadequate, ... the general jurisdiction of
equity may be invoked to enforce the lien ..."
Regardless of whether a writ of execution could issue under
these facts or not, the only conveivable way a judgment lien could
ultimately attach to the Property was for the Willard Wood Deed to be
set aside. As long as the deed was valid, no lien could ever attach
or have priority.

Prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons could have

attempted to set aside the Willard Wood Deed if they thought is was
fraudulent and foreclose the lien in an equitable action. But Wood's
Bankruptcy voided the Judgment, and since a fraudulent conveyance
complaint is predicated on an obligation that no longer exists, there

can be no "new claim11 for fraudulent conveyance.
Conveyance Act does not create a new claim.

The Fraudulent

"If no new claim exists,

there is no remedy. ... Only a creditor, that is no having a claim
... may attack a conveyance as fraudulent."

Clark v. Rossow, 657

P.2d 903, 904 (Ariz. App. 1982).
In Clark, the plaintiffs, Clark and Frizzell, brought a separate
action to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent made by defendants,
Rossows.

Clark and Frizzel had obtained a money judgment against

Rossows and attempted to collect the judgment from Rossows' grantee,
Consociation, by garnishment proceedings.

In a second action, Clark

and Frizzell alleged that Rossows had made a fraudulent conveyance to
Consociation and sought to have the conveyance set aside so they
could execute on the real property.

Consociation responded with a

motion to have the judgment declared void since Mr. Rossow had been
adjudged bankrupt in Minnesota, and, therefore, the judgment was
discharged. That motion was granted and the trial court declared the
judgment null, void, and of no force or effect.1

Clark said at 904:

"[Consociation] moved for summary judgment on the theory
that the prior judgment was void. Since the fraudulent
conveyance complaint is predicated on an obligation claimed
to be owing from the appellees Rossows to the appellants
... [Clark and Frizzell] ... and there is no such
obligation, the trial court properly dismissed the
complaint. The fraudulent conveyance act, A.R.S., Section
44-1001, et seq., does not create a MEW CLAIM. If a claim
does not exist, there is no remedy. (Citing cases) The
appellees Rossows were no longer creditors of the
appellants [Clark and Frizzell]. Only a creditor, that is
one having a claim .. • may attack a conveyance as
fraudulent." (Emphasis added)

1

Lynda Baldwin made a similar motion as Consociation under
the Supplemental Motion For Declaratory Judgment". dated March 15,
1989. (R. 472) Therein, she sought to have the Judgment declared
void for purposes of her prior "Motion For Summary Judgment".
-

2d

-

Therefore,

Wood's

Bankruptcy

effectively

discharged

any

fraudulent conveyance claim that might be asserted by Burtons, and
prohibited them from ever bringing an equitable action to foreclose
the lien. Burtons were no longer creditors of Willard Wood and could
not attach the Willard Wood Deed.

Without being able to bring a

claim to void the deed, there is no remedy under any Utah law. Thus,
Burtons could never, and did not, acquire a lien on the Property
superior to the interest of Lynda Baldwin.
ARGUMENT V
The Burton Group Has Waived Any Claim Of Fraudulent Conveyance
By Not Raising It As An Affirmative Defense In Their Answer
In its Memorandum Decision, page 6, the trial court correctly
found that the Burton Group has never made a claim to set aside the
Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance.

Their Counterclaim

does not evidence such claim, (R. 391), and they did not raised fraud
as an affirmative defense in their Answer as required by Rule 8(c),
U.R.C.P, (R. 387 to 388), much less plead it with particularity as
required by Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. Therefore, they waived that defense
and are precluded from making it in response to a motion for summary
judgment.

n

In pleading to a proceeding pleading, a party shall set

forth affirmatively .. fraud .. and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.11

Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P.

n

In all

averments of fraud .. the circumstances constituting fraud .. shall
be stated with particularity.w

Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P.

Burtons' Answer

fails under both Rules.
The statutory requirement of pleading an affirmative defense,
such as fraud, is supported by many decisions in Utah and other
states. Any new matter that does not tend to controvert the opposing
party's prima facie case shall be pleaded and is not put in issue by

a denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b), U.R.C.P.

General Ins. Co. of

America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976),
citing 2A Moores' Federal Practice (2d Ed.)/ Sec. 8.27[3], p. 185.).
Affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings, Rule
8(c),

and are usually waived if not pleaded, Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h);

Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1986), citing Pratt v. Board
of Education. 564 P.2d at 298.
Lynda Baldwin is not bound to prove in the first instance or at
the outset in support of her action that the Willard Wood Deed is
valid and genuine.

Ball v. AutryP 427 P.2d 424, 428 (Okl. 1966);

RQlUlW vf LQJdoiq, 512 P.2d 937, 941 (Alaska 1973); 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 1271 (1969); 2A J*
Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 8.27 [3] (2nd Ed. 1972).

If the

Burton Group believes the deed is fraudulent, the burden is them to
raise the "new matter" which might constitute an avoidance or an
affirmative defense of Lynda Baldwin's complaint.
Prather. 585 P.2d 336 (N.M. App. 1978).

McCasland v.

Any alleged fraud under the

Willard Wood Deed, an affirmative defense, affects the substantial
rights of Lynda Baldwin and will not be abrogated.

Allis-Chalmers

CQCPt Vt SyqJtQWJCZ, 571 P.2d 224, 225 (Wash. App. 1977), citing

Farmer'? Insurance CQt Vt Miller, 549 p.2d 9 (wash. 1976). The fraud
also be plead fraud with particularity by setting out specific facts
constituting the alleged fraud.

Sade v. Hemstrom. 471 P.2d 340, 345

(Kan. 1970).
Thus, failure to plead the affirmative defense results in waiver
of it and exclusion of the issue from the case. Turon State Bank v.
Bozarth. 684 P.2d 419 (Kan. 1984); Chandler v: Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028
(Mont. 1982); and RST Service Mfg. Inc. v. Mussell White. 628 P. 2d
- 26 -

366 (Okl. 1981).

Upon such failure ".. no evidence can be submitted

relevant £o that issue." Schmidt v. Sadri, 601 P.2d 713 (Nev. 1979).
An alleged fraudulent conveyance "is not put at issue by a
general denial" of Lynda- Baldwin's prima facie case. 5e£ gfrinn ZXVEquipment. Inc. v. Marchard. 462 P.2d 571, 572 (Wash. App. 1969),
citing 1A Barron and Holtzoff Fed. Prac. & Proc, Sec. 277, at 147,
and 2A Moore's Fed. Prac, Sec 8.27[3]k.

The Burton Group cannot

"make a demand for affirmative relief by filing an answer defensive
in nature which tends only to establish a defense or interpose a bar
to plaintiff's right to recover", SS£ Firestpne Tire $ Rufrfter CQt Vt
Barnett. 475 P.2d 167, 170 (Okl. 1970).
In response to the motions for summary judgment, the Burton
Group submitted affidavits attacking the Willard Wood Deed, trying
"to establish a defense or interpose a bar to plaintiff's right to
recover."

Firestone Tire & Ruber, at 170.

But defenses that have

not been raised by the answer or proper motion may not be raised in
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and do
not create a genuine issue of material fact precluding
judgment.
1983).

summary

Valley Banft ft Trust Co, yy WilKen, 668 P.2d 493-94 (Utah

SS& also Sadfi, at 346.

SSS. also Radio Corp. of America v.

Radio Station KYFM. Inc.. 424 F.2d 14 10th Cir. (Wash. 1970); and 2A
J. Moore, Fed. Prac, Sec. 8.27[3] (2d Ed. 1975).
Therefore, an alleged fraudulent conveyance is an affirmative
defense that affects the substantial rights of Lynda Baldwin, and
must

be

plead

and with

the

required

particularity.

"Belated

affidavits11 filed by Burtons in response to the motions for summary
judgment are insufficient.

Thus, even if such a claim had survived

Wood's Bankruptcy, the Burton Group has waived it.
- 97 -

ARGUMENT VI
Statute of Limitations Bars The Burton Group From
Attacking Willard Wood Deed As Fraudulent Conveyance
The trial court correctly found that the Burton Group was barred
from attacking the Willard Wood Deed as a fraudulent conveyance under
the three year limitations period imposed by Section 78-12-26(3),
U.C.A., which states:
"78-12-26. Within three years — Within three years:
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovcsry by the
aggravated party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake•"
So when did Burtons discover facts constituting the alleged
fraud?

The "conveyance" was made in May 1980 •

Burtons had

"constructive notice" of the alleged fraudulent conveyance at three
different dates: (i) in Nay 1980, when the Willard Wood Deed was
recorded, (ii) in June 1981, when the judgment was entered in the
Burton Lawsuit; and (iii) in September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust
Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded and Baldwins took "open and
notorious possession" of the Property. While separately any of these
facts might be insufficient to establish "constructive notice" of the
alleged fraud, in the aggregate they are compelling.
Regarding the "constructive notice" given to Burtons when the
Judgment was docketed in June 1981, in Villa National B3flK v« green,
478 P.2d 681, 682-83 (Colo. App. 1970), in was held, under facts
substantially the same as this case, that a general creditor obtains
"constructive notice" of the alleged fraudulent deed when he becomes
a judgment creditor, and the statute of limitation begins to run when
the final judgment is obtained.

Citing Greco v» Puilara, 444 P.2d

383, 384 (Colo* 1968). Thus, the statute of limitations began to run

in June 1981, when the Judgment was docketed.

But the statute of

limitations might begin to run when the deed is recorded.

In their

Brief, page 26, Burtons cite Smith v. Edwards, 17 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah
1932) and Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975) as authority
opposing that proposition.
However, the facts in Smiih and Leach are distinguishable from
those here.

The words "until the discovery by the aggravated party

of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake19 within Section 78-1226(3) mean from the time the fraud was known or could have been
discovered

in

exercise

of

reasonable

diligence,

and

do

not

necessarily mean from the time the party complaining had actual
notice of the fraud.

Mason v. Laramie Rivers Company, 490 P.2d 1062

(Wyo. 1971). Burtons' claim for a fraudulent conveyance accrued, for
statute of limitation purposes, when they, by exercise of "reasonable
diligence", might have discovered it.

Transamerica Ins. Co. v.

Trout. 701 P.2d 851 (Ariz. App. 1985); and Coronado Development

Corporation y f Superior Court# 678 p.2d 535 (Ariz. App. 1985).
"Reasonable diligence11 in collecting a money judgment would
require that at the time of or some time after acquiring the
Judgment, Burtons would research the public record for any real
property owned or recently transferred by Willard Wood, particularly
his residence.

Had they done so, Burtons would have discovered not

one, but three deeds: (i) the Willard Wbod Deed, recorded in May
1980, (ii) the Kofoed Trust Deed, recorded in September 1981, and
(iii) the Woods' Deed, recorded in September 1981.

Armed with such

information, Burtons could have easily deposed Willard Wood to
discover why he executed the two deeds in 1981 after he had conveyed
his estate in 1980.

If Burtons then believed the 1980 deed was

fraudulent in light of the 1990 deeds, Burtons could have challenged
it then, in 1981, or within three years thereafter.

Therefore, the

statute of limitations could begin to run no later than September
1981, when the Kofoed Trust Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded, and
the Willard Wood Deed was clearly evident.
As creditors with a matured claim, Burtons could have also
researched the public record prior to entry of the Judgment and found
and attacked the Willard Wood Deed.

A creditor who has a cause of

action for an unliquidated demand may attack a conveyance in fraud of
his rights prior to entry of judgment.

The three-year limitations

period accrues from the time the creditor has a claim or cause of
action for an unliquidated demand, because he could attach the
conveyance in fraud of his rights prior to entry of the judgment as
he is held to be within the protection of the statutes against
fraudulent conveyances.

Babcock v. Tamr 156 F.2d 116, 121 (1946),

citing Valley BanK Vt Malcolm, 204 P. 207, 214 (Ariz. 1922).

Thus,

an action by a judgment creditor to set aside for fraud a conveyance
of property by a debtor to his wife is barred by the three-year
statute of limitations where the action was brought more than three
years after the conveyance was recorded. Babcock, supra.
In their Brief, Burtons suggest that the Willard Wood Deed was
given for "nominal consideration11, if any at all. Thus, the contents
of the deed allegedly disclose the fraud.

If that be true, the

statute of limitations might begin to run when that deed was recorded
in May

1980.

When

facts under which fraud

is predicated

are

contained in written instrument placed on public record, there is
constructive notice of its contents and the statute of limitations
runs from date of recording.

See Strong v. Clark. 352 P.2d 183, 184
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(Wash. 1960).

As such, it could begin to run even before a person

has actual knowledge of the fraud or even all the underlying details
of the alleged fraud.

See Coronado Development Corporation, at 537;

and Mr. Donut of America, Inc. v. Harris. 723 P.2d 670 (Ariz. 1986).
Had Burtons used "reasonable diligence11 in researching the title to
Willard Wood/s own residence, all three deeds would be discovered.
Furthermore, Baldwins purchased the Property in September 1981,
and were in open, exclusive and notorious possession from then on.
"Open and notorious possession" is constructive notice to third
parties of an outstanding equity, and a judgment creditor is thereby
informed of sufficient facts to put him on inquiry by which he can
ascertain the existence of the equity.

Partlow v. Clark, 653 P.2d

568, 570 (Or. App. 1983). Chaffin Yt SQlQIROn, 465 P.2d 217, 220 (Or.

1970); and Wilson Yt Willamette Industries, Inct, 569 p.2d 6ii (or.
1977). Burtons are clearly time-barred from bringing a new claim for
fraudulent conveyance under any one or more of the above scenarios*
ARGUMENT VII
The Willard Wood Deed Is Valid, And Has Never Been
Set Aside Or Properly Challenged In Any Equitable Action
In the 1989 Order, the trial court correctly determined that the
Willard Wood Deed was valid and enforceable.

(Ex.

fv fV

M ,#l)

Under

Section 57-4a-4(l), U.C.A., a recorded deed is presumed genuine, and,
under Section 57-1-3, is presumed to pass a fee simple title unless
otherwise stated.

Thus, the recorded Willard Wood Deed is prima

facie valid and conveyed his entire estate to Tonya Wood.

Not only

is the deed prima facie valid as between the parties, it is valid as
to creditors.
between

f,

The holdings imply that [a] .. conveyance 'good as

the parties' cannot be void

transferor11.

as to

a creditor

of the

Rowe v. Schultz. 642 P.2d 881, 884 (Ariz. App. 1982).

Notwithstanding any document Willard Wood signed after his delivery
of the deed to Tonya Wood, the deed is valid as to Burtons in absence
of it being voided, if at all, in an equitable action.
In the Memorandum Decision, page 6, (Ex. "L"), the trial court
correctly found that "[n]o action has been filed to sat that
conveyance aside .."

In response, the Burton Group asserts in its

Brief, pages 18-22, that no action was "necessary" because, in their
opinion, the conveyance was "void in toto" under Section 25-1-8,
U.C.A.

The Burton Group further states on page 29, that:

"Burtons have not requested that any fraudulent conveyance
be set aside because such request is unnecessary, inasmuch
as Burtons' judgment lien is of record. .. The fraudulent
conveyance issue was first raised by Baldwins as a defense
to Burtons' execution."
Thus, Burtons allege they could simply disregard the conveyance
and levy execution directly against Baldwin's property under Section
25-1-15(2), U.C.A., without ever taking any action to void the
conveyance.

In their Brief, page 19, the Burton Group asserts that

"a fraudulent conveyance is not merely voidable, but is "void in

toto".
1094,

They cite Meyer Yt general American CQrpQEafriQn/ 569 p.2d
1098 (Utah 1977), and Cardon v. Harper. 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah

1944). But Meyer and Cardon involve conveyances that were "decreed"
void after an equitable action by the creditor, and those facts are
distinguishable from this case were the Burton Group has never
received a decree or found it "necessary" to take any such action.
Notwithstanding the "shall be void" language of Section 25-1-8,
U.C.A., if a recorded deed is prima facie valid, "[a] conveyance
which is fraudulent as to creditors is not absolutely void, but is
only voidable by the creditors." United States v. 442 Casks of Wine.
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26 U.S. 547 (U.S. La. 1828).2

Burtons/ argument for the remedy

otherwise is contrary to this Court's holding in Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 P.2d 1244, 1262 (Utah 1987): "The remedy provided by the Act for
a fraudulent conveyance is the voiding of the conveyance. Section 251-8.w

This implies the deed is not "void11, but merely "voidable".
It is clear from Butlerr United States, and the cases footnoted

below that a deed which secures the private rights of the parties
interested is not "void", as if it never had any effect, without some
affirmative

action

to

avoid

it.

But

Burtons

claim

it was

"unnecessary" to take such action, and, therefore, didn't. Adopting
Burtons' theory would shift the burden under an alleged fraudulent
conveyance from the creditor to the transferee. Section 25-1-8 does
not have that intent.
The Burton Group asserts on page 20 of their Brief that because
the Willard Wood Deed was void, they had the right to disregard it
and levy on the Property under Section 25-1-15(2), U.C.A. They claim
that: "This statute expressly allows credtors to disregard a
fraudulent conveyance, and to execute upon property which is under
the name of the fraudulent transferee".

In relying on that remedy,

the Burton Group cites Jensen v. Eames. 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974);
Gayne v. Bailey, 564 P.2d 348 (Wash. App. 1977), ffontana AffS'n 9f

Credit Management Vt Hergert, 593 p.2d 1059 (Mont. 1979), and sassJsin
Yt KerStinq, 458 P.2d 544 (Ariz. 1969).

2

. The question of "void" or "voidable" was addressed in detail
in Doney v. Lauahlin. 94 N.E. 1027, at 1028, and in Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. Winne, 49 P. 446, at 488. (No deed which secures
the private rights of the parties interested is ever "void", but
merely "voidable" upon the proper action by an interested party.)
See Footnote No. 4 on pages 21-23 of Lynda Baldwin's "Reply
Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motions For Summary Judgment" for a
summation of that authority.

In those cases, however, after obtaining the judgment, the
judgment creditors took appropriate action against the "transferee"
within

an

equitable

conveyance.

proceeding

to

set

But Burtons never did that.

aside

the

fraudulent

Even then, to invoke the

remedy of Section 25-1-15(2), the property must be in the "hands of
a fraudulent transferee".
(Utah 1987).

Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1262,

But when Burtons levied execution directly on the

interest of Lynda Baldwin, the Property was not in the "hands of a
fraudulent transferee", it was in the hands of Lynda Baldwin.

Tonya

Wood was the alleged "fraudulent transferee" under the Willard Wood
Deed, not Lynda Baldwin who acquired her interest from Tonya Wood.
Moreover, Butler, at 1262, implies that when a creditor looks to the
fraudulently conveyed property under Section 25-1-15(2), the transfer
must be "held" void as a fraudulent conveyance.
Thus, prior to Wood's Bankruptcy, Burtons might have levied
execution when the Property was in the hands of Tonya Wood, but
didn't. They waited 5 years and then levied execution on property in
the hands of Lynda Baldwin, and Lynda Baldwin certainly contested.
And the Jensen court, at 428, held that ".. once contested the burden
is upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the transfer was in fact fraudulent."
When Lynda Baldwin brought her prima facie case to dimiss the levy,
the Burton Group could not dispense with their burden of pleading and
proving the conveyance was fraudulent.
544, 547 (Ariz. App. 1969).

Sackin v. Kerstina. 458 P.2d

The evidence shows they did nothing,

relying instead on their assertion that the conveyance was "void",
and any action was "unnecessary".
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ARGUMENT VIII
Lynda Baldwin Was Deprived Of Her Property
Without Due Process Under the Execution Proceedings
Any procedure which deprives an individual of a significant
property interest must satisfy due process of law. Mervyn's Inc. v.
Superior Court in and for Maricooia County. 697 P.2d 690 (Ariz.
1985).

SSS Bank of Ephriam v. Davis. 581 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah

1978); State In Interest of L.G.W.. 638 P.2d. 527, 528 (Utah 1981)

and celebrity Slvfoi Inct Vr Utah Liquor Cqntrol QQJK'TI, 657 p.2d 1293,
1296 (Utah 1982).

"Implicit in the due process clause of our state

Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their
rights under the law.11
1978).

Gribble v. Gribble. 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah

A hearing is constitutionally required when an action taken

by this State deprives a person of a property interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moore yf Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d
634, 637 (Utah 1986). A writ of execution may not issue against the
property of Lynda Baldwin without a prior hearing.
Family Finance Corp.f 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969).

See Sniadach v.

A hearing must be

prefaced by a timely notice which adequately informs Lynda Baldwin of
the specific issues she must prepare to meet.

Nelson v. Jacobson,

669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983).
To give the execution proceedings validity, she must be brought
within the jurisdiction of the court by service of process within the
State, or by her voluntary appearance.

Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S.

733; Bonford v. Socony Mobile Oil Co.. 440 P.2d 713 (Okl. 1968).
Lynda Baldwin was not served with process in the manner provided by
law.

Jurisdiction cannot be acquired without strict compliance with

the statute governing service of process in civil actions. Shields
v. Pirkle Refri. Trucking,. Inc.. 591 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1979). First

and basic to jurisdiction is service of process.

Painter v. Olney,

680 P.2d 1066 (Wash. App. 1984). A levy on Lynda Baldwin's property,
deprived her of a significant property interest without due process.
The constructive seizure, intiated by Burtons under a void
judgment without a valid lien, encumbered the Property with a lien
and inhibited Lynda Baldwin's right to dispose of or encumber her

asset. PanK of Ephriaro, at 1005.
ARGUMENT IX
Lynda Baldwin Is A Bona Fide Purchaser For Value
And Has Never Lost That Status
Under the facts and law of this case, Lynda Baldwin is not
required in the first instance to prove she is a bona fide purchaser
for value ("BFP") under Section 25-1-13, U.C.A. Moreover, the Burton
Group never made a claim to defeat Lynda Baldwins BFP status in their
answer or counterclaim, and could not so in response to a motion for
summary judgment. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundarem, 692
P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984).

Nevertheless, Baldwins were BFPs in

September 1981, when they purchased the Property from the only titled
owner of record, Tonya Wood, (R. 158; R. 550; R. 546, #6). They had
no notice of the Judgment or any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood
Deed.

(R. 546, #8)

Burtons argue in their Brief, page 31, that Lynda Baldwin is not
a BFP because w[a] purchase is not made in good faith if it is made
with notice of a prior adverse interest in the property". They argue
that "docketing of a judgment operates as constructive notice of the
existence thereofff. This argument has no merit because there was no
"prior adverse interest", in that no lien attached to the Property.
Burtons also argue in their Brief, page 33, that Lynda Baldwin
is not a BFP because she had "actual knowledge" of the Judgment
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through her alleged agent, Western States Title Company ("Western")•
This argument as well has no merit because the Judgment did not
create a lien against the Property. Nonetheless, Western was not the
agent for Baldwins. Baldwins never employed Western to research the
title, nor did they ever pay Western to do so.

(R. 545, #2)

Upon acquiring the Property, Baldwins had no "actual knowledge"
of the Judgment from Western or anyone else.

(R. 410, #4; R. 413; R.

546, #6, 7, 8 & 9) Burtons, however, argue on page 33 of their Brief
that Western's "failure to discover or disclose Burton's judgment
lien .. is no defense to Burton's lien."

Once again, no judgment

lien ever attached, so there was nothing to disclose.

Although

Western knew of the Judgment against Willard Wood, (R. 138, #7), they
also knew of his prior conveyance under the Willard Wood Deed, (R.
138, #8). Moreover, the question in determining Lynda Baldwin's BFP
status under Section 25-1-13 is whether Lynda Baldwin, through
Western or otherwise, had previous notice of any fraudulent intent of
her immediate grantor, Tonya Wood, or of any fraud rendering void the
title of Tonya Wood.

Knowledge of a "judgment" is irrelevant under

Section 25-1-13, which states:
"25-1-13.
Bona fide purchasers not affected.
The
provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to affect
or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate
grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such
grantor."
Notwithstanding Western knew of the Judgment, there is no
evidence that even remotely suggests that Western had previous notice
of any alleged fraud under the Willard Wood Deed. Baldwins purchased
the Property without any previous notice whatsoever of any alleged
fraudulent intent under any conveyance, believing in good faith that

it belonged to Tonya Wood.

As evidenced in their affidavits, no one

ever told Baldwins anything that would cause them to know or believe
there was anything improper regarding the Willard Wood Deed.
410, #5; R. 413, #5; R. 546, #s 8-9; R. 566, #3)

(R.

These facts are

undisputed in any document or affidavit submitted by Burtons.
In their Brief, page 33, the Burton Group argues that Baldwins
personally had at least constructive notice of the fraudulent nature
of the Wood's Deed delivered to them on September 30, 1991. The fact
that Willard Wood signed the Woods' Deed does not affect title to the
Property because he had no interest then.

Willard Wood's signature

on the Woods' Deed does not put Baldwins on notice to inquire further
or question the validity of the Willard Wood Deed, since Tonya Wood
was the only titled owner of record.

(R. 550)

Baldwins clearly

provided the reason that Willard Wood signed Woods' Deed, i.e.,
because he appeared to have some "naked interest of record19.

(R«

410, #6; 413, #6) That "naked interest of record", if any, resulted
presumptively from his signature on the Kofoed Trust Deed.
In their Brief, page 34, the Burton Group argues that even if
Lynda Baldwins was a BFPs at the time of her initial purchase, she
subsequently lost that status because of the foreclosure of the
Kofoed Trust Deed, notwithstanding she later reaquired the Property
from Derald Til ley.

(R. 379) But a loss of Lynda Baldwin's interest

under the Kofoed Trust Deed foreclosure in 1986 doesn't change the
fact that she was a BPF in 1981 when she purchased from Tonya Wood.
Under

Section

25-1-13,

if

she

had

no

previous

notice

of

any

fraudulent intent of her immediate grantor, Tonya Wood, or of any
fraud rendering void the title of Tonya Wood, she was a BFP.
Burtons also claim that when they levied the Execution, they
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were relying on Section 25-1-15(2), U.C.A.

But the remedy of that

statute is not available when the alleged fraudulent conveyance is to
a BFP "one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such
a purchaser".

There is no evidence that Tonya Wood, the transferee

under the Willard Wood Deed, is anything but a bona fide purchaser,
and

Baldwins

derived

their

title

through

her.

In

Butler

v.

Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1262 (Utah 1987), this Court determined the
"BFP" issue and the availability of the remedy under Section 25-1-8
under facts similar to ours.

Butler. at 1262, held that:

"The remedy provided by the Act for a fraudulent conveyance
is the voiding of the conveyance. Section 25-1-8. That
remedy is not available, however, when the property has
been transferred from the fraudulent transferee to a thirdparty purchaser for value without 'notice of a fraudulent
intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering
void the title of such grantor. Section 25-1-13. Since
Christensens did not have that intent, the conveyance to
them cannot be voided."
*

*

*

*

*

"Generally, when a transfer is [held] void as a fraudulent
conveyance, the creditors look to the fraudulently conveyed
property under Section 25-1-15. In this case, however, the
land was not in the hands of a fraudulent transferee [Tonya
Wood], but was owned by the Christensens [third-party
grantees of the transferees]* Section 25-1-13 deals with
property that is fraudulently conveyed, but held by
innocent third persons. That section provides that the
provisions of the Act do not affect the title of a
purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. The trial
court expressly found Christ ensen to be a bona fide
purchaser, and we have affirmed that ruling."
Sfifi also jQhngQn V» Smith/ 455 P. 2d 244, 245 (Wyo. 1969); Cody
Finance Co, v. Leaaett. D. Wyo., 116 F. Supp. 700, 705 (reaffirmed
214 F.2d 695); 53 C.J.S., Sec. 13; and Hudson Trust Co, v. Davis. 49
S.Ct. 179, 278 U.S. 655.

".. [A] conveyance obtained through fraud

and deceit is not a nullity, but a conveyance from a fraudulent
grantee [Tonya Wood] to a third person [Baldwins], who purchased the
property in good faith and for a consideration, will be held valid as
against the first grantor

[Willard Wood]."

Mid Kansas Federal

Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Binter, 415 P.2d 278, 282 (Kan. 1966).
Until a debtor's creditors have acquired some "lien" on his property,
he may depose of it and give a good title to bona fide purchasers
without regard to such creditors. Hurst v. D.P, Davis Properties, 54
S.Ct. 857, 292 U.S. 648.
Thus, the protection under Section 25-1-13 is available to Lynda
Baldwin if she was a "purchaser for a valuable consideration" who
purchased the Property without "previous notice of the fraudulent
intent of [her] immediate grantor or of the fraud rendering void the
title of such grantor". Conversely, the remedy under Section 25-115(2) is not available to Burtons if Lynda Baldwin was a "purchaser
for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of
the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or mediately
from such a purchaser".
ARGUMENT X
The Burton Group Wrongfully Levied Execution On Lynda Baldwin's
Property Which Justified Setting Aside Execution Sale
The Execution (Ex. "D") which was prepared by Burtons, was
wrongfully sought and issued without a valid lien and enforceable
judgment. It states ".. the amount actually due thereon is $4,323.73
and interest .." It authorized a levy on and sell the unexempt real
property of the judgment debtor, Willard Wood. But Burtons issued a
"Praecipe" (Ex. "E") directing a "levy on all right, title and
interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-ininterest of Willard D. Wood, defendant in the above-entitled action".
Pursuant to the Praecipe, the Sheriff prepared a Notice of Levy (Ex.
"F") and "levied upon the right, title, claim and interest of Gregory
Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors-in-interest of Willard D.
Wood..."

Under the Notice of Sale (Ex. "G") and Newspaper Notice
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(Ex.

f, ,f

H )/ the Sheriff intended to sell Baldwins' property.

The

Certificate of Sale (Ex. "J") and Sheriff's Deed (Ex. "K") evidence
the levy on and sale of Baldwins' property. Under all such documents
subsequent to the Execution, it is clear Burtons intended to levy on
and sell the property of Baldwins to satisfy the unenforceable debt
of Willard Wood out of their property.
Thus, there were substantial prejudicial irregularities both in
the acquiring the Execution and in causing the Execution Sale, and
the Burton Group deliberately caused all of it.

The trial court

correctly found that: H .. Burton has obtained Baldwin's property by
improperly prepared documents, all in violation of the rights of
Baldwin".

(Ex. "L", p. 5 ) .

In the 1989 Order, the trial court

correctly determined that all documents subsequent to the Execution
19

.. were wrongfully and erroneously prepared, issued and carried out

without legal justification ..w

(Ex. "M", #5)

The Burton Group's

actions did not conform to statutory requirements, and deprived Lynda
Baldwin of her property without due process.
"Where the property sold was not subject to sale, the sale
should be set aside .. as only the execution debtor's interest in the
property is affected by the sale."

33 C.JeS., Sec. 232, p. 491. A

sheriff's sale of real property should be set aside when the sale
fails to conform to statutory requirements«
Simmons, 658 P.2d 68 (Wyo. 1983).

2-H Ranch Co.. Inc. v.

The Sale was justly set aside.

ARGUMENT XI
The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Lynda Baldwin
Attorney Fees And Related Damages
Under the 1989 Order granting partial summary judgment to Lynda
Baldwin, the trial court reserved for later determination

ff

.. the

issues of damages under such claims, including attorney's fees

incurred by Baldwin in regards to her having the Execution Sale and
Sheriff's Deed voided .."

(Ex. "M", #7)

Dwight Epperson, Esq.,

counsel for Lynda Baldwin, then filed his "Affidavit Of Attorney's
Fees" ("Damages Affidavit"), (R. 641), requesting $12,715.25 in
damages.

In response, Burtons filed an objection ("Objection") to

the Damages Affidavit.

(R. 659)

Following a hearing on May 14,

1990, the trial court allowed only 60% of the total damages requested
by the Damages Affidavit.

(R. 666)

Subsequently, under the 1990

Order and 1990 Judgment, the trial court awarded $7,829.66 to Lynda
Baldwin, representing "attorney's fees and related damages" incurred
by her in the matter.

(Ex. "0"; Ex. "P"; R. 669, 667.)

The detailed facts of the Damages Affidavit are uncontroverted
by any affidavit of the Burton Group.

Rule 56, U.R.C.P., "is no

different where the subject of the summary judgment is a claim for
attorney fees". Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah
App. 1989).

"..[W]here attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing

party on summary judgment, the undisputed, material facts must
establish, as a matter of law, that (1) the party is entitled to the
award and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable."

Taylorr at 169.

Notwithstanding they filed the Objection, the Burton Group did not
file

any opposing

affidavit

controverting

either

the damages

requested or their reasonableness. Taylor. at 172. "Thus, there was
no dispute of material fact regarding the damages requested or their
reasonableness." Taylor. at 169. Therefore, attorney's fees may be
awarded on summary judgment if the record contains an unrebutted
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award*
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975).

Uncontroverted testimony concerning the amount of a reasonable fee
42

provides an adequate basis for the fee award.

South Sanpitch Co. v

Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988).
In their Brief, pages 36-39, the Burton Group argues the trial
court errored in awarding any damages.

They claim the trial court

didn't indicate the "legal basis" for the award, but did acknowledge
it could be under either (i) Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., (ii) slander
of title, or (iii) wrongful execution.

To affirm the damage award

this Court must conclude, in light of the undisputed facts, that a
"legal basis" exists.

Taylor, at 168.

Although the exact legal

basis is not specifically set out as such in the Memorandum Decision,
1990 Order, or 1990 Judgment, the 1989 Order does shed some light on
the mind of the trial court in this regard. (Ex. "M", #s 5 & 7) But
there is no transcript of the hearing in the record or written
memorandum informing this Court of the trial court's legal view of
the matter.

However, this Court "can affirm the judgment if any

legal basis exists to justify the trial court's award of damages."
Beuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
The legal basis for the award of "attorney's fees and related
damages" can be found under (i) Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., (ii)
wrongful execution, (iii) slander of title, (iv) Rule 11, U.R.C.P.,
or (v) a combination of any or all of them, as discussed hereafter.
Actions Or Defenses Without Merit And Lacking Good Faith
One such legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls
under Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., which provides:
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute
or agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith."

"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or
agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense
to the•action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith." Taylor, at 170. "The standard in that section specifically
includes an examination into the good faith of a litigant," O'Brien
v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah 1987).

"Lack of good faith for

purposes of 78-27-56 turns on subjective intent."

Taylor, at 170?

Cafly yt jQhnSQH, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983).
Cady. at 151, held that two elements are required under Section
78-27-56 in addition to being a prevailing party: (i) the claim must
be "without merit"; and (ii) the losing party's conduct must be
"lacking in good faith". Cady, at 151, then defined both elements.
First, "without merit" means "bordering on frivolity", citing Can-Am
Petroleum Co, v. Beck. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir.1964), or "of little
weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact."

Second,

"lacking in good faith" means the inverse of "good faith".
faith" means: "(1) an honest belief
activities

in question;

"Good

in the propriety of the

(2) no intent to take unconscionable

advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact
that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or defraud
others". Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1987), citing Cady.
at 151. "Lacking in good faith" is found when one of the three above
elements is lacking. Cady. at 151. There is substantial evidence in
the record that the Burton Group's conduct and defenses thereof were
both "without merit" and "lacking in good faith", as shown by the
following facts more fully discussed elsewhere in this brief.
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As detailed throughout this brief, the claims and defenses of
the Burton Group have no basis in law or in fact and are "without
merit" because: (i) the Willard Wood Deed was prima facie valid under
57-4a-4(l),

U.C.A.,

avoidable

only

upon

a successful

equitable

attack; (ii) there was no valid lien against the Property under 7822-1, U.C.A.;

(iii) Burtons only

lien rights were against the

unexempt real property of Willard Wood; (iv) the Judgment was no
longer enforceable because of 11 U.S.C.,

Section 524(a)(1); (v) no

lien survived Wood's Bankruptcy because there was never a valid lien
to begin with; (vi) an affirmative action to foreclose the lien and
set

aside

the

alleged

fraudulent

conveyance

was

necessary

to

establish lien priority over the interest of Lynda Baldwin; (vii)
title to the Property was clearly in the name of Lynda Baldwin when
Burtons

levied

execution;

(viii)

all

execution

documents

were

improperly prepared and irregular, and violated Lynda Baldwins due
process rights; (ix) an execution proceeding under Rule 69, U.R.C.P.,
where no lien attached cannot be used as a substitute for an action
to foreclosure an alleged judgment lien; (x) 11 U.S.C., Section
524(a)(1) prohibited a claim for fraudulent conveyance, and the
Fraudulent Conveyance Act did not create a "new claim11; (xi) there
was no remedy under Section 25-1-15(2) because Burtons were no longer
judgment creditors and had lost their ability to attack the Willard
Wood Deed; (xii) there was no remedy under Section 25-1-15(2) against
a

person

other

than

a

"transferee",

nor

against

a bona

fide

purchaser; (xiii) legal process under Rule 69(a), U.R.C.P., was not
available absent a valid lien and an enforceable judgment; (xiv) the
statute of limitations under 78-12-26, U.C.A., had run a claim for
fraudulent conveyance; (xv) Lynda Baldwin was not a party to the

Burton Lawsuit, had not been served with legal process, and that
court had no jurisdiction over her or her property; (xvi) Lynda
Baldwin was not a judgment or execution debtor, nor a "successor-ininterest" to Willard Wood, nor a "transferee" of him; (xvii) the
execution proceeding was conducted with erroneously and wrongfully
prepared documents; (xviii) Lynda Baldwin was a BFP; and (xix) all
the other reasons detailed throughtout this brief.

The Burton

Group's arguments against in support of their claims and defenses
contradict the law of this case and ever material finding of the
trial court. Thus, their claims and defenses are "without merit".
The conduct of the Burton Group is "lacking in good faith"
because: (i) they could not have had "an honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question", in that they were
represented by counsel with full knowledge of the facts and law on
the issues and there was no legal basis whatsoever for anything they
did; (ii) they clearly "intended to take unconscionable advantage" of
Lynda Baldwin's

financial plight under the Kofoed Trust Deed

foreclosure by implementing the wrongful levy on and sale of her
property without justification; and (iii) they intended to defraud
the

court

and

ultimately

Lynda

Baldwin

of

her

property

by

representing to the court clerk, upon delivering the Execution for
the court's issuance; that the Judgment was enforceable against
Willard Wood when they knew it was not; i<>e«, by inference, they
purposely concealed the fact that the personal obligation shown in
the Execution was discharged in Wood's Bankruptcy and Willard Wood
was no longer liable to Burtons for the amount shown therein. Proof
of any one of these facts establishes the second element, "lack of
good faith". See Eames v. Eames, at 397; citing Cady. at 151.
- 46 -

Wrongful Execution
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls
under "wrongful execution,f.

Attorney's fees may be an item of

consequential damages flowing from the wrongful execution. There is
simply no excuse for the Burton Group's cavalier conduct regarding
Lynda Baldwin's property, particularly in absence of a statutory lien
and enforceable judgment.

The wrongful execution proceedings under

Rule 69 were conducted under the direction and participation of
Burtons.

After acquiring the Execution (Ex. "D") against Willard

Wood which they themselves prepared, Burtons issued the Praecipe (Ex.
"E") directing the Sheriff to levy on and sell the property of
Baldwins, rather than Willard Wood.

Such wrongful execution was not

only "lacking in good faith", but in direct violation of Utah law.
The general rule of law regarding wrongful executions is that
".. if it is shown that the execution creditor advised, directed or
assisted in the commission of the unlawful act he will be liable with
the officer for the injury sustained."

Foley v. Audit Services.

IH£Li., 693 P.2d 528, 531 (Mont. 1985); citing 33 C.J.S. Executions,
Sec.

456(b)(2).

"Liability

is generally

premised

upon direct

participation, such as advising the sheriff to seize certain assets
not belonging to the judgment debtor or ratification of the sheriff's
wrongful acts."

Foley, at 531; citing several cases.

"Moreover, if

the creditor authorized the unlawful act, the creditor would be
liable in its own capacity for wrongful execution."

Foley. at 531.

The general rule in Utah ".. is that attorney's fees are not
recoverable unless allowed by statute or contracted
parties unless, of course, equity permits otherwise."

for by the
Ranch Homes,

Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 625-26 (Utah 1979);

citing Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976). Attorney's fees
incurred in a legitimate and reasonable attempt to secure the return
of property by an order to quash the writ of execution

are a

reasonable, probable, and foreseeable consequence of a wrongful
execution and are recoverable.

Coaains v. Wright, 526 P.2d 741, 743

(Ariz. App. 1974); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Executions, Section 763. ".. [T]hey
are a legitimate item of damages caused by the other party's wrongful
acts."

Western Gas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchantr 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah

1980); citing Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah
1979), and 20 Am.Jur. 2d., Costs, Sec. 72. Such damages are allowed
when the party performing the execution has acted in bad faith.
Peterson v. Montana Bank of Bozeman. 657 P.2d 673, 681 (Mont. 1984).
Attorney's fees may be awarded under the so-called "obdurate
behavior11 doctrine, where the losing party is shown to have acted in
bad faith or for oppressive reasons.

Hall v. Cole. 412 U.S. 1, 93

S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed. 2d 702 (1973); E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. v.
Andersonr

596 P.2d 413, 416 (Colo. App. 1979).

"This exception

applies to bad conduct relating to the prosecution or defense of the
action." E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc.. at 416; citing 6 Moore, W. Taggart,
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice, SeCe 54.77[2] (2d ed. 1976).
w

[T]he dissolution of the writ of execution is conclusive that the

writ was wrongfully obtained."

Cogginsf at 743; citing cases.

In their Brief, page 39, the Burton Group assert that Lynda
Baldwin should not have been awarded damages because ".. Burtons'
execution upon the property caused no damage to Baldwin". They claim
Lynda Baldwin was in default under the Kofoed Trust Deed and about to
lose her interest anyway. Moreover, they claim any conflict between
the interests of Burtons under their alleged judgment lien and those

represented by the Kofoed Trust Deed constitutes a conflict as to
"lien priority", not a wrongful exection. This argument has no merit
because there was no conflict in "lien priority".

The fact is,

Burtons had no valid lien under which to assert any priority.
By initiating the wrongful execution, the Burton Group merely
took unconscionable advantage of Lynda Baldwin in her financial
plight. They did all this in direct violation and willful disregard
of Lynda Baldwin's due process rights.

Their cavalier conduct can

best be summed up by their assertion that the Willard Wood Deed was
"void", and they could simply "disregard" it. Accordingly, Burtons
are liable for damages where such execution is caused by their
disregard for the rights of others and their own misconduct, direct
participation and bad faith.
Slander of Title
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls
under "slander of title".

To be liable for slander of title, the

Burton Group must "publish matter which is untrue and disparaging" to
Lynda Baldwin's interest in the Property. Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d
644, 649 (Utah 1954). EsndSE, at 649-50, held that the publisher of
the matter is liable under Restatement Of The Law On Torts, Vol. Ill,
Sees. 624 and 626-7, if the disparaging matter, dealing with a
statement of fact, is "untrue", or "if an expression of opinion is
dishonestly made".
All of the documents under the execution proceedings recorded
against the title to Lynda Baldwin's property were "untrue" because
they tell the public the Property was sold to the Burton Group, when
in fact it wasn't•

They tell the public Lynda Baldwin was a

"successor-in-interest" of Willard Wood, when in fact she wasn't.

The

Burtons

created

the

Execution

document

which

dishonestly

represented that they were still creditors of Willard Wood and he was
still liable for the debt, when in fact he wasn't.

They initiated,

participated in, and condoned the preparation of erroneous documents
that stated her property had been sold, when in fact it hadn't. Such
documents were "disparaging" to Lynda Baldwin's substantial property
interest because they created a frivolous cloud on her title that
required this action.

Pender, implies that attorney's fees may be

appropriate if the above facts are present. (Cf. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel
and Slander, Sec. 550.)
Violation Of Rule 11, U.R-C.P.
Another legal basis for affirmation of the damage award falls
under Rule 11, U.R.C.P.

In

Taylor Yt Estate Qf laylOF/ 770 P.2d

163, 170-72 (Utah App. 1989), it was held:
"Finally, we turn our attention to Rule 11, U.R.C.P.,
providing, in part, as follows:
"The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modication, or reversal of existing
law... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court ...
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include ... a reasonable
attorney's fee."
This rule, which mirrors Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, "requires some
inquiry into both the facts and the law before the paper is
filed; the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances." 5 C. Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1333 at 177
(1987 Supp.). This objective approach allows sanctions to
be imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the
pre-amenedment, subjective "bad faith" approach. [Citing
cases.]
*

*

*

*

*

*
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*

*

However, in a number of cases this court has imposed
sanctions pursuant to our rules, including R. Utah Ct.App.
40(a) which imposes a similar duty on litigants and their
counsel. [Citing cases•]
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Rule 40(a) is to this court what Rule 11 is to the trial
courts*
Both rules require attorney's and parties to
reasonably inquire as to the facts and law before a
document is signed and filed. Rule 40(a) is substantially
similar to Rule 11 •."
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

These cases establish that Rule 40(a) imposes a duty to
investigate the factual and legal basis of an appeal or
appellate document before filing.
[Citing cases.]
Subjective intentions are essentially irrelevant; the
determination of whether the rule has been violated is made
on an objective basis. Id. Except to the extent that a
somewhat less forgiving approach should perhaps be employed .
at the appellate level, we find that this analysis is
equally applicable to the similarly worded Rule 11.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11
is a question of law.
[Citing case.]
If a Rule 11
violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated,
and we will affirm the particular sanction imposed by the
trial court, including the reasonableness of any fee award,
absent an abuse of discretion. [Citing case.] We are
mindful that Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the
particular case. [Citing case*]"
Applying the forgoing analysis of Taylor to this case, the award
of fees to Lynda Baldwin must be affirmed.

Clearly, a "reasonable

inquiry" at the time by Burtons or their attorney, as contemplated by
Rule 11, should have reasonably disclosed that their defense to Lynda
Baldwin's Complaint, their counterclaim, their opposition to Lynda
Baldwin's motions for summary judgment, and their own motion for
summary judgment were not "well grounded in fact" nor "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument".

Substantially none of the

defenses, claims and assertions in their pleadings have any basis in
law or in fact.

The Burton Group had a duty to investigate the

factual and legal basis of their pleadings before filing.
By failing to conduct this inquiry, the Burton Group and their
counsel violated Rule 11. This neglect caused Lynda Baldwin to incur
-

RI

legal expense in researching the legal basis and validity of their
actions, and initiating and maintaining this lawsuit to void the
execution proceedings and remove the cloud from her title.

This is

precisely the type of case Rule 11 is intended to address, and the
facts mandate the sanctions awarded by the trial court.
The

imposition

of

$7,827

in

"attorney's

fees

and

related

damages" as a sanction for violating Rule 11 is not an abuse of
discretion.

It was appropriate for the trial court: to consider and

include the damages incurred by Lynda Baldwin in consequence of the
Burton Group's conduct and their pleadings. Accordingly, under Rule
11, there is a legal basis and undisputed factual support for an the
damage award.
Sanctions Under Rule 40(a), U.R.A.P.
Substitute Appellee requests sanctions for having to respond to
this Appeal.

When sanctions are awarded in the trial court, they

should be awarded to that same party if successful on appeal.

See

DiXQn Vt StQdflarfl, 765 P. 879, 881 (Utah 1988); and Management Servs.

Corpt

Vt Development Assoc?t, 617 p.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980).

Sanctions are awarded in situations were the "totality of defendant's
argument compels this Court to find that he is attempting to take
unconscionable advantage

..M which evidences a frivolous appeal.

Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
Cady. at 397.

See also

The Utah Court of Appeals defines a frivolous appeal

"as one having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in
Rule 40(a)." Q'Brien Vt RW5h, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
This Court equated frivolous with being without merit."
310.

O'Brien, at

That alone meets the technical requirements of Rule 40(a).
Substitute Appellee recognizes the right of a party to argue in
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an attempt to correct what that party thinks is error in the trial
court.

But when there is no basis for the argument presented and

when the evidence or law is mischaracterized and misstated and the
claims have no merit, the Court must question the party's motives.
See Eamesf at 397-398.

The facts and law of the case clearly show

that no judgment lien ever attached to the Property under 78-22-1;
that the execution proceedings were clearly wrongful and violated
Lynda Baldwin's due process rights; and that an affirmative action
was necessary to defeat the prima facie valid Willard Wood Deed. The
trial court found no merit in any contentions or defenses of the
Burton Group.

Nevertheless, they continue to argue right into this

appeal against substantially all of the trial court's findings, and
further assert that all they did to Lynda Baldwin under the execution
proceedings was merely that done by "any reasonable creditor under
the circumstances.w

The simple fact is, they never acquired a valid

lien and were no longer creditors.

Thus, the Burton Group has

misstated the facts and law on several issues.
It should have been equally obvious that the appeal has no
reasonable legal or factual basis.

The record shows that the trial

court ruled against the Burton Group on every material issue they
raised and dismissed their counterclaim with prejudice.

The record

further shows the trial judge carefully fashioned and reduced the
attorney's fees and related damages after a fair opportunity for
hearing.

The Burton Group's claims on appeal simply controvert the

findings of the court. They are not only without merit, but are also
without basis in law or fact. Substitute Appellee is entitled to the
benefit of Rule 40(a).
their award.

This is exactly the type of case calling for

The case should be remanded for the limited purpose of

determining sanctions against the Burton Group for bring this appeal,
with an order requiring payment of them to Substitute Appellee.
Related Damages
Substitute Appellee performed certain paralegal services in the
trial court for Dwight Epperson, Esq., attorney for Lynda Baldwin.
Copies of the Itemized Statements submitted to Mr. Epperson by Paul
H. Richins & Co., Inc., are attached to the Damages Affidavit.
644-658)
trial

(R.

In their Brief, pages 39-43, the Burton Group asserts the

court

errored

in

awarding

Lynda

Baldwin

$4,597.60

in

"secretarial fees and/or paralegal costs". However, the trial court
did not specify any amount of the damage award as "secretarial fees
and/or paralegal costs". In the 1990 Judgment, the court identified
the $7,872*66 damage award as ".. payment for attorney's fees and
related damages incurred by plaintiff in this matter", but did not
allocate the award. To the extent any part of the "related damages"
are secretarial fees and/or paralegal costs, the trial court must
have concluded that each was an element of damages and recoverable.
In regards to the element of "related damages", this Court "can
affirm the judgment if any legal basis exists to justify the trial
court's award of damages."
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).

Beuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752
The Burton Group did not file any

opposing affidavit controverting this element of damages or their
reasonableness. See Taylor. at 172. "Thus, there was no dispute of
material fact regarding the damages requested or their reasonableness."

See Taylor, at 169. This element of the attorney's fee may

be awarded on summary judgment if the record contains an unrebutted
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award.
See Freed Fin. Co., at 1040. Uncontroverted testimony concerning the

amount of a reasonable fee provides adequate basis for the fee award.
South Sanpitch Co, v Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988).
Although not specifically addressed in this Court, several other
courts have held that the services of paralegals and secretaries
acting as paralegals under the supervision of the attorney are
recoverable.

Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp.. 374 S.E.2d

868 (N.C. 1989); MUlti-IWtQ Vt ITT CQTOfflerSJal Finance, 806 S.W.2d 560
(Tex. App. 1991); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 P.2d 810 (8th
Cir. 1983), citing numerous federal cases; Aires v. Palmer Johnson,
Inc. , 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App. 1987); Newport v. Newport, 759 S.W.2d
630 (Mo. App. 1988); Sebastian yf Texas Peptt of CQrrectiong/ 558 p.
Supp. 507 (1983); S.R. v. S.M.R., 709 S.W. 2d 910 (Mo. App. 1986).3
A "paralegal" includes "paralegals, legal assistants and law
clerks". AEi£S, at 1384.

"A paralegal is an assistant that 'act[s]

for the lawyer in the rendition of [his] professional services' and
is under his direct supervision."

Newport, at 636.

A legal

assistant does "those things that an attorney does not necessarily
need to do."

Multi-Motor at 571.

"Paralegals .. may perform legal

services properly considered as a component in an award of attorney's
fees". Aires. at 1384. "A trial judge, acting within his discretion,
may consider and include in the sum he awards as attorney's fees the
services expended by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals
if, in his opinion, it is reasonable to do so."

Lea Co. r at 871.

"In cases in which attorney's fees may be recovered, reasonable

*• In Alaska, paralegal fees are recoverable as an item of
costs, pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 79(b).
Paralegal fees are
routinely allowed by the Federal Courts in claims brought under
federal statutes which provide for an award of attorney's fees.
Hawkins Vt AnhSUSer-BVlSCh, 697 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1983); Sebastian v.
Texas Deot. of Corrections, 558 F.Supp. 507 (Dist. Tex. 1983).

paralegal fees are allowable." NewportP at 637; citing Hawkins. at
817, and S.R.r at 916. "A party may separately assess and include in
the award of attorney's fees compensation for a legal assistant's
work, if that assistant performs work traditionally done by an
attorney."

Multi-Mottor at 570. "Paralegal fees should be allowed

if reasonable and not duplicative of other legal fees." Hawkins, at
817, citing numerous federal cases.
The rationale behind the above cases is that the use of
paralegals may result in savings to clients and lower overall fee
awards.

Lea, at 871.

As this case clearly demonstrates, Mr.

Epperson's use of Paul H. Richins & Co., Inc., as the paralegal
resulted in a substantial savings to Lynda Baldwin. As complex and
fact intensive as this case is, the total amount of $7,872.66 for
attorney's fees and related damages is not unreasonable regardless of
its allocation.
legal issues.

Considerable research was required covering many
Based upon the hourly rates of both, it was more

economical for the paralegal to do that research and other routine
work than the higher priced attorney.

Because of the indepth,

pretrial work done by the paralegal for the attorney, this case never
went to a long, expense trial that would have undoubtedly cost Lynda
Baldwin and the state far more.

In a trial, attorney's fees can

escalate dramatically, and would have if this case had gone to trial.
The paralegal performed the work under the direct supervision
and control of the attorney, and billed the attorney for the
services.

The paralegal paid his own overhead and office expenses

out of the hourly rate charged to the attorney.

In his billing

statement, the paralegal identified the nature of the work performed
for the attorney, his hourly rate, and the number of hours expended
56 -

by him. The work was obviously necessary, and the attorney must have
considered the paralegal's qualification acceptable or the attorney
or would not have employeed him.

But the qualifications of the

paralegal were never objected to in the Objection, (R. 659), or put
at issue in the trial court, although the Burton Group now attempts
to put them at issue for the first time on appeal.
Paralegal services are an adjunct of attorney's fees, rather
than an item of costs.

Treating paralegal expenses as an item of

attorney's fees insures that such expenses are related to legal
services and are performed under the auspices of an attorney.

The

Burton Group suggests that f,[a]llowing paralegal costs in the present
case would encourage paralegals to act outside of the direction or
control of a licensed attorney, in potential violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-51-25.

However, Burtons have submitted no

evidence whatsoever that the paralegal acted outside the direction or
control of the attorney.

In fact, the Damages Affidavit evidences

such direct supervision and control.

(R. 602)

Presumably, the trial judge found facts to support the award of
"attorney's fees and related damages99.

The fact that the Damages

Affidavit, which allegedly included reasonable paralegal fees, was
uncontroverted by any opposing affidavit from Burtons, coupled with
the presumptive expertise of the trial judge in assessing the facts
and the Burton Group's overall conduct, claims and defenses, constitutes sufficient justification for affirming the award.
ARGUMENT XII
Summary Judgment Is Appropriate
The Burton Group submitted several affidavits containing mere
assertions, allegations and factual conclusions that an issue of fact

exists without a cause of action or proper evidentiary foundation to
support them, and are insufficient to preclude granting of a summary
judgment motion.

To raise a genuine issue of fact, the affidavit

must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions, and
must 'set forth specific facts' showing a genuine issue for trial.
An assertion that an issue of fact exists without proper evidentiary
foundation in support is insufficient to preclude summary judgment*

see Reagan QirtflQQr Advertizing, met v- mntigrem, «>92 p.2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984), citing Norton v. Blackam. 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Wggter v.
Sill/ 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); citing several cases; and Matter of
Winslow's Estate, 636 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash- App. 1981).
Burtons made their best showing under the pleadings and
affidavits submitted. Burtons have not presented affirmative factual
evidence or otherwise impeached the evidence presented in Baldwins'
affidavits in their opposition to the motions for summary judgment.
The only issue Burtons raised is whether the Willard Wood Deed was a
fraudulent conveyance. But that issue is barred by (i) the statute
of limitations, (ii) the discharge of the Judgment under Willard
Wood's bankruptcy, and (iii) their failure to plead fraud as an
affirmative defense.

Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact

regarding a fraudulent conveyance, and the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate and serves
its intended purpose of avoiding fruitless court proceedings with
their attendant cost in time and money.

Larson v. Wycoft Co.. 624

P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981).
DATED this 11th day of February, 1992.

Paul H. Ricnilns
Substitute Appellee
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